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## **From Wales to Washington: Evolution of NATO Security Paradigm in the Last Decade**

*At the Washington Summit, I am confident we will demonstrate NATO's unity and strength once again – in support of Ukraine, and to keep all our people and values safe.<sup>1</sup>*

*Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General*

### ***Paradigm Shift***

On July 9-11, 2024, Washington hosted the NATO 75th anniversary Summit, with the major topics being deterrence and defence, Ukraine and the global partnership in the Indo-Pacific region. In fact, these three topics are interrelated and reflect the change of paradigm in NATO security thinking in the last decade.

It isn't surprising that Ukraine was among the main topics of the Summit. Since 2014 the developments in this country are having a profound impact on the Euro-Atlantic security and NATO political-military agenda, culminating in Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which triggered tectonic changes in the international area.

It's indeed interesting the evolution of NATO security thinking and, respectively, its defence planning and force posture since the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. This ominous event prompted the Alliance to shift its focus from low-intensity, counter terrorist operations back to its core task - collective defence.

In April 2013, the last US main battle tank left Europe due to President Obama's policy of cuts in the US military spending, which included force drawdown in Europe. However, a year later, in response to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, the NATO Wales Summit agreed the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) and established the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) able to deploy "within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO's territory."<sup>2</sup> Another important achievement of the Summit was the decision to "reverse the trend of declining defence budgets"<sup>3</sup> of the member states and ensure their gradual increase up to 2% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) within a decade. At Wales, the Allies also decided to prepare for countering Russia's possible hybrid warfare tactics, which employs a combination of both military and non-military measures to promote the Kremlin international agenda.

### ***Biggest Reinforcement in a Generation***

Two years later, the Warsaw Summit established NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) and Tailored Forward Presence (TFP) in eastern and southeastern flanks of the Alliance, including the Black Sea region. The goal of the deployment was to “unambiguously demonstrate Allies' solidarity, determination, and ability to act by triggering an immediate Allied response to any aggression.”<sup>4</sup> The EFP comprised four multinational battalions deployed in Poland and Baltic states on a “voluntary, sustainable, and rotational basis,”<sup>5</sup> able to operate together with national forces and supported by respective reinforcement strategy. The TFP included the Romanian initiative to establish a multinational framework brigade to “improve integrated training of Allied units under Headquarters Multinational Division Southeast.”<sup>6</sup>

These were extraordinary decisions, which signified a departure from NATO decades-long policy of refraining from “additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces”<sup>7</sup> in the territory of the new member states, as it was provided by 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act (NRFA). The deployment was a long overdue reaction of the Alliance to Russia’s blatant violation of international law, which, as it was underlined in the Wales Summit declaration, “challenged the fundamental principles of the global and Euro-Atlantic security architecture.”<sup>8</sup>

It should be emphasised that, regrettably, the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and occupation of its territories by Russia didn't stir the same reaction from the Alliance. Despite NATO's promise that, with Russia, it “cannot continue with business as usual,”<sup>9</sup> the Alliance restored normal relationship with Moscow in less than a year following the 2008 invasion. Hearing the same - no business as usual - pledge from NATO after the annexation of Crimea left a bitter aftertaste and sense of *deja vu*. Fortunately, the determination of the Allies in the case of Ukraine has been more sustainable than the Kremlin presumably had been expecting.

### ***Zeitenwende***

Nevertheless, until 2022, most of the Alliance didn't consider Russia to be a direct threat as respective NATO summit declarations indicate. This approach was reflected in meagre defence spendings with only six Allies reaching the 2% threshold by 2021.<sup>10</sup> The invasion of Ukraine shattered this reality causing the biggest reconfiguration of NATO force posture and defence planning since the Cold War and surging the financing for the military needs of the Alliance. The 2022 NATO Security Concept describes Russia to be the “most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.”<sup>11</sup> This definition has been maintained by all subsequent NATO summits.

One of the most vivid demonstrations of altered threat perceptions was Germany, which, despite being the largest European economy, has been underfunding its defence sector to the point of negligence for decades. However, just three days after the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz declared that it was “*Zeitenwende*” - a turning point - announcing key changes in German foreign and security policy. In the context of the new policy, the Chancellor pledged an additional €100 bln for the defence spendings through a special fund, as well as an increase of defence budget by 0.5% to meet the NATO requirements.<sup>12</sup>

Currently a record 23 Allies have allocated at least 2% of their GDP for the defence budget with a total 18% increase in NATO defence spendings in 2024.<sup>13</sup>

At the same time, Allies, taking into account the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, have been focusing on enhancing military industry and raising its output capacity, as well as streamlining defence trade across the Alliance. In the Vilnius Summit in 2023, the member states reconfirmed the pledge, endorsed back in 2014, to allocate 20% of their defence budgets for purchasing major new equipment and undertaking related research and development efforts. The Defence Production Action Plan, endorsed in Vilnius, comprises three major themes: “aggregating demand, addressing defence industrial challenges and increasing interoperability.”<sup>14</sup> The Plan is supposed to take into consideration the similar developments in other international organisations, particularly the European Union. At the Washington Summit, building on the Defence Production Action Plan, the Allies agreed to the NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge, which should “strengthen transatlantic defence industrial cooperation and help Allies restock their arsenals while continuing to send military aid to Ukraine.”<sup>15</sup> In other words, there is an immediate goal to provide Ukraine with the necessary weaponry, while longer-term plans aim at ensuring adequate military supplies for the Allies.

When it comes to the force posture, after the invasion of Ukraine, NATO increased both geography and the size of its forward forces deployed in eastern and southeastern flanks by adding four multinational battle groups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia and scaling them up from the battalion sized units to the brigade levels.<sup>16</sup> More importantly, NATO established the Allied Reaction Force (ARF) - a strategic, high-readiness, multi-domain force, which is able to deploy at very short notice “to strengthen deterrence in peace and crisis, or to create a strategic dilemma for adversaries.”<sup>17</sup> According to the Secretary General Stoltenberg, currently, about 500 000 NATO forces are on a high readiness level.<sup>18</sup>

The effectiveness of NATO’s new force structure and the defence plans have been tested at the largest post-Cold War multinational exercise Steadfast Defender 24, which continued for several months in 2024 and engaged about 90 000 troops from all over the Alliance. The exercise was held in thirteen allied countries under the Article 5 scenario, covering all five military domains - land, maritime, air, space and cyber. One of the major goals of the Steadfast Defender 24 was “to highlight and exercise NATO’s ability to deploy forces rapidly from North America and other parts of the Alliance to reinforce the defence of Europe.”<sup>19</sup>

### ***New Members of NATO: Is Ukraine Getting Closer?***

Another very significant development, generated by the Russian-Ukrainian war, was the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. The fact that these well-established European countries with the long tradition of neutrality, robust defence capabilities and advanced military industry, decided to join the Alliance immediately after the invasion of Ukraine, clearly demonstrates the grave deterioration of the Euro-Atlantic security environment. The membership of Finland and Sweden has further bolstered NATO capabilities and strengthened the allied security. It has geopolitical implications for the entire Euro-Atlantic area, transforming the Baltic sea into a NATO sea and doubling the size of the Alliance's border with Russia.

Paradoxically, the war seems to move forward Ukraine's NATO accession process. Since 2014, after Kyiv renounced its “non-block” status, introduced by the Yanukovich administration, there hadn't been any meaningful progress in Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration. However, at the 2023 Vilnius Summit, Kyiv’s relationship with the Alliance was upgraded by establishing NATO-Ukraine Council, “where Allies and Ukraine sit as equal members to advance political dialogue, engagement, cooperation, and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO.”<sup>20</sup> The Allies also decided to drop the

Membership Action Plan (MAP) requirement for Kyiv, which was set by NATO since the 2008 Bucharest Summit as a necessary prerequisite and a next step in the process of membership of Ukraine and Georgia.<sup>21</sup> In Washington, the Alliance emphasised Ukraine's "irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration."<sup>22</sup>

In fact, the war of Ukraine accentuated its importance for the security of the Alliance. The Washington declaration states that "strong, independent, and democratic Ukraine is vital for the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. Ukraine's fight for its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders directly contributes to Euro-Atlantic security."<sup>23</sup> This kind of thinking about Ukraine's role wasn't prevalent in NATO before Russia's full-scale invasion, but rather developed in recent years leading to political decisions on advancing Kyiv's NATO membership bid, as well as providing it with sustained practical assistance to build a force "capable of defeating Russian aggression today and deterring it in the future."<sup>24</sup> These practical measures include:

- Establishment of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) tasked to coordinate the provision of military equipment and training for Ukraine by Allies and partners. NSATU will be a new NATO command deployed in Germany and led by the three-star general with roughly 700 strong staff;
- Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine for the provision of military equipment, assistance, and training. For this purpose, the Allies intend to provide a "minimum baseline funding" of €40 billion next year;
- establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Centre (JATEC);
- Launching new joint activities to support Ukraine's self-defence through the first NATO-Ukraine Innovation Cooperation Roadmap.
- Appointment of NATO Senior Representative in Ukraine.<sup>25</sup>

As the Secretary General Stoltenberg outlined, these steps "constitute a bridge to NATO membership, and a very strong package for Ukraine."<sup>26</sup>

### *America's Isolationist Tendencies*

It should be underlined that, along with the Russian threat, there is another factor that influenced the decision of the European Allies to increase their defence spending, namely a growing isolationist sentiment in the US. This sentiment has been fuelled by the unwillingness of most European Allies to meet the 2% defence benchmark, as well as the increasing confrontation between the US and China, which the American strategic community believes to be a more significant threat than Russia.<sup>27</sup>

The former US President and Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump has been vigorously expressing his frustration with European Allies and the need for the US to dramatically decrease its engagement, or even withdraw from NATO. According to the EU Commissioner Thierry Breton, in 2020, in Davos, President Trump told European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen that if Europe is under attack, the US wouldn't come to help and that the US would leave NATO.<sup>28</sup> In a similar manner, in February 2024, addressing a rally in South Carolina, Donald Trump recounted telling a colleague from Europe that if they wouldn't meet the NATO requirement for defence spending, in case Russia invades, he wouldn't come for help, in fact, he would encourage Russia "to do whatever the hell they want."<sup>29</sup> Not surprisingly, the former President was heavily criticised for these remarks, though his team members defended his views. Donald Trump campaign senior adviser Jason Miller told NBC News: "President Trump got our allies to increase their NATO spending by demanding they pay up."<sup>30</sup>

Besides the words, we have witnessed specific actions, or rather inaction, when the US Congress, due to partisan infighting, couldn't pass for months the bill enabling the government to provide Ukraine with the desperately needed military aid. The delay, which contributed to additional territorial losses by Ukraine, has once again demonstrated to the European Allies the need to spend more on defence, as well as take more responsibility regarding Ukraine.

### ***The Chinese Controversy***

The Washington Summit also highlighted the existing controversies, if not confrontation in the NATO-China relations, which have become particularly acute after the invasion of Ukraine. According to the Summit declaration, the “PRC has become a decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine through its so-called “no limits” partnership and its large-scale support for Russia’s defence industrial base. This increases the threat Russia poses to its neighbours and to Euro-Atlantic security.”<sup>31</sup> The document emphasises “sustained malicious cyber and hybrid activities, including disinformation, stemming from the PRC” and expresses concerns over China's expanding nuclear arsenal calling Beijing for reciprocal transparency.<sup>32</sup>

Furthermore, in Washington, it was the first time that the Allies indicated possible consequences China may face for assisting Russia’s war against Ukraine: “the PRC cannot enable the largest war in Europe in recent history without this negatively impacting its interests and reputation” - states the Summit declaration.<sup>33</sup> In fact, by considering the Sino-Russian strategic partnership as “mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order” and maintaining that “PRC continues to pose systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security,”<sup>34</sup> the Alliance assumes China to be a security threat. This assumption, logically, should find its way in respective NATO decisions related to defence planning and force posture.

In Vilnius and Washington, the Allies met with the leaders of Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea, as well as the President of the EU. As the Secretary General Stoltenberg outlined, the goal of the meeting was to address “shared security challenges, including Russia’s war against Ukraine, China’s support for Russia’s war economy, and the growing alignment of authoritarian powers.”<sup>35</sup> The Washington declaration expressed NATO’s decision to enhance practical cooperation with the Indo-Pacific partners in supporting Ukraine, fighting disinformation, cyber defence and technologies.<sup>36</sup> These efforts clearly indicate that NATO is stepping up cooperation with the regional partners to counter the “no-limits partnership” of China and Russia.

### ***Still Strong - as Long as It Remains United***

In Washington, NATO celebrated its 75th anniversary bracing to face multiple threats to the Euro-Atlantic security and the rules based international order. Since 2014, the Alliance has undergone profound transformation realigning its security priorities, force structure and defence spending accordingly. After the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, NATO has been developing plans to deter and, if necessary, defeat possible aggression of Russia. In parallel, the Alliance is preparing to counter China's global ambitions, which enjoys “no limits partnership” with Russia and challenges the US led international order. The possibility of conventional attack against NATO is further aggravated by an array of hybrid and asymmetric threats emanating from state and non-state actors. Such a large variety of threats and challenges triggered 360 degrees readiness from the Alliance.

Throughout its existence, one of the most remarkable characteristics of NATO was its adaptability to the changing security environment. Whether it was the Soviet threat, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in former Yugoslavia, counter terrorist missions in Afghanistan, or assisting Ukraine to withstand the full scale Russian invasion, the Alliance demonstrated a unique ability to adapt and respond to the dangerous developments in the international arena.

At the Washington Summit NATO emerged in its strongest appearance - the Alliance of 32 advanced states comprising half of the world economy and wielding half of the world's military might, ready to protect the freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity of its one billion population.<sup>37</sup> In fact, currently there is no country or the conceivable alliance that could overcome the combined power of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Having said this, the biggest threat for NATO could be the potential disengagement of the US, advocated by Donald Trump and his national security team. It remains unclear, in case Donald Trump takes the office, how far he would go whether in decreasing the US participation in the Alliance, withdrawing its commitments to European security, or halting the NATO Open Door policy. However, any such development would definitely suit the Kremlin, which considers NATO as a major obstacle to its revanchist and expansionist agenda. One shouldn't forget that lately, China, also, directly or indirectly, has been expressing concerns regarding the enlargement of the Alliance and its growing cooperation with Indo-Pacific countries.<sup>38</sup> Weakening NATO would weaken the security of all its members on both sides of the Atlantic and make the entire democratic world vulnerable to authoritarian powers.

It is a mere fact that during the Cold War, the strong transatlantic unity and adherence to NATO collective defence prevented another devastating war and ensured lasting peace in Europe. Likewise, the post-Soviet enlargement of the Alliance enhanced the area of peace, stability and democracy in the continent. The Secretary General, speaking at the Wilson Centre on 17th June, 2024, underlined that NATO membership will ensure the lasting peace in Ukraine.<sup>39</sup>

It's critical that NATO remains strong, united and committed to the Open Door policy enabling Ukraine, Georgia and other aspirant countries to join in due course. This would deter Russia's further aggressions and allow the idea of Europe whole, free and at peace to become a reality, which is a prerequisite for securing the rules based international order and ensuring that the Euro-Atlantic civilisation and the entire international community develop and prosper in a peaceful environment.

<sup>1</sup> Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Wilson Center Auditorium followed by Q&A; 17 June, 2024 [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_226742.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_226742.htm)

<sup>2</sup> Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales;  
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<sup>3</sup> Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales;  
[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_112964.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm)

<sup>4</sup> Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016;  
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<sup>5</sup> Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016;

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<sup>6</sup> Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016;

[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133169.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm)

<sup>7</sup> Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France;

[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_25468.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm)

<sup>8</sup> Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales;

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<sup>9</sup> Statement Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels;

[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_29950.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_29950.htm?selectedLocale=en)

<sup>10</sup> Who's at 2 percent? Look how NATO allies have increased their defense spending since Russia's invasion of Ukraine;

<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/whos-at-2-percent-look-how-nato-allies-have-increased-their-defense-spending-since-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/>

<sup>11</sup> NATO 2022 Strategic Concept

[https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> Germany's New Plans for Transforming Its Defence and Foreign Policy Are Bold. They Are Also Running Into Familiar Problems;

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/01/germanys-new-plans-for-transforming-its-defence-and.html>

<sup>13</sup> Who's at 2 percent? Look how NATO allies have increased their defense spending since Russia's invasion of Ukraine;

<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/whos-at-2-percent-look-how-nato-allies-have-increased-their-defense-spending-since-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/>

<sup>14</sup> NATO's role in defence industry production;

[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_222589.htm#:~:text=of%20these%20areas.-.Defence%20Production%20Action%20Plan,engagement%20with%20the%20defence%20industry.](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_222589.htm#:~:text=of%20these%20areas.-.Defence%20Production%20Action%20Plan,engagement%20with%20the%20defence%20industry.)

<sup>15</sup> NATO's role in defence industry production;

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<sup>16</sup> NATO's military presence in the east of the Alliance;

[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_136388.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm)

<sup>17</sup> NATO ALLIED REACTION FORCE; <https://nrdc-ita.nato.int/operations/allied-reaction-force#:~:text=The%20NATO%20Allied%20Reaction%20Force,than%20has%20previously%20been%20possible.>

<sup>18</sup> Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government;

[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_227417.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_227417.htm?selectedLocale=en)

<sup>19</sup> NATO MARKS THE START OF EXERCISE STEADFAST DEFENDER 2024;

<https://shape.nato.int/stde24/newsroom/news-/nato-marks-the-start-of-exercise-steadfast-defender-2024>

<sup>20</sup> Vilnius Summit Communiqué;

[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_217320.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm)

- <sup>21</sup> Vilnius Summit Communiqué;  
[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_217320.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm)
- <sup>22</sup> Washington Summit Declaration;  
[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_227678.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm?selectedLocale=en)
- <sup>23</sup> Washington Summit Declaration;  
[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_227678.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm?selectedLocale=en)
- <sup>24</sup> Washington Summit Declaration;  
[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_227678.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm?selectedLocale=en)
- <sup>25</sup> Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Council; issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council in Washington, D.C. 11th July 2024;  
[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_227863.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227863.htm?selectedLocale=en)
- <sup>26</sup> Joint press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy; [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_227508.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_227508.htm?selectedLocale=en)
- <sup>27</sup> Trump's Plan for NATO Is Emerging; Politico;  
<https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/07/02/nato-second-trump-term-00164517#:~:text=Most%20recently%2C%20Trump%20actually%20appeared,their%202014%20summit%20in%20Wales.>
- <sup>28</sup> Trump vowed he'd 'never' help Europe if it's attacked, top EU official says; Politico;  
<https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-vow-never-help-europe-attack-thierry-breton/>
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<https://abcnews.go.com/amp/Politics/closer-trumps-years-criticizing-nato-defense-spending/story?id=107201586>
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[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_227678.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm?selectedLocale=en)
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- <sup>34</sup> Washington Summit Declaration;  
[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_227678.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm?selectedLocale=en)
- <sup>35</sup> Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of State and Government, Indo-Pacific Partners and the European Union  
[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_227435.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_227435.htm?selectedLocale=en)
- <sup>36</sup> Washington Summit Declaration;  
[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_227678.htm?selectedLocale=en](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm?selectedLocale=en)
- <sup>37</sup> The Secretary General's Annual Report 2023;  
[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_223291.htm#:~:text=In%202023%2C%20NATO's%20Allies%20represent,than%20they%20would%20be%20alone.](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_223291.htm#:~:text=In%202023%2C%20NATO's%20Allies%20represent,than%20they%20would%20be%20alone.)
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<https://www.pbs.org/newshour/amp/world/china-warns-nato-not-to-create-chaos-in-asia-and-rejects-label-of-enabler-of-russia>
- <sup>39</sup> Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Wilson Center Auditorium followed by Q&A; 17 June, 2024 [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_226742.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_226742.htm)



